If you notice some outdated information please let us know!
PASS
The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.
Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.
This section looks at the code deployed on the relevant chain that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.
1. Are the smart contract addresses easy to find? (%)
All Tornado Cash smart contracts are listed here.
2. How active is the primary contract? (%)
The 10 ethereum deposit/withdraw contract was used at its very least 65 times a day during the past month ((270 ETH + 380 ETH)/10 ETH), as indicated in the Appendix.
3. Does the protocol have a public software repository? (Y/N)
Github: https://github.com/tornadocash
4. Is there a development history visible? (%)
With 340 commits across the 6 branches in the tornado-core repository, this is a healthy repository.
5. Is the team public (not anonymous)? (Y/N)
Team members/contributors were found at https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core/graphs/contributors.
The difference between this and the old link is solely the link. This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
6. Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)
Location: https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core#whitepaper
7. Is the protocol's software architecture documented? (Y/N)
This protocol's private transaction software architecture is documented at https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core#specs.
8. Does the software documentation fully cover the deployed contracts' source code? (%)
There is no software function documentation.
9. Is it possible to trace the documented software to its implementation in the protocol's source code? (%)
There is no software function documentation.
10. Has the protocol tested their deployed code? (%)
11. How covered is the protocol's code? (%)
No test for coverage seen. However, Tornado Cash certainly has rigorous testing practices.
12. Does the protocol provide scripts and instructions to run their tests? (Y/N)
Scripts/Instructions location: https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core#initialization
13. Is there a detailed report of the protocol's test results?(%)
Although there is in depth CI in the github, numerous tests have encountered failed checks, making results inconclusive. CI is published here.
14. Has the protocol undergone Formal Verification? (Y/N)
There is no evidence to show Tornado Cash has undergone formal verification.
15. Were the smart contracts deployed to a testnet? (Y/N)
The smart contracts were deployed to the Etherium Goerli network. The contracts' respective addresses can then be located using the corresponding inputs you would find on any other networks or as shown in the Appendix.
This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.
16. Is the protocol sufficiently audited? (%)
17. Is the bounty value acceptably high (%)
Tornado cash has no documentation of their active bug bounty program of 1.3M, it is in effect nonetheless.
This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.
18. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to find?
The protocol's admin control information is well labelled and well explained. You can find a brief overview in their home page under the "Our strapiucts" section, or in depth information in their governance Medium article.
19. Are relevant contracts clearly labelled as upgradeable or immutable? (%)
20. Is the type of smart contract ownership clearly indicated? (%)
The smart contracts are under the ownership of their DAO as outlined in their Medium article. However, it is documented that community funds are governed through a MultiSignature wallet on Gnosis Safe.
21. Are the protocol's smart contract change capabilities described? (%)
The documentation covers the capabilities for change for all smart contracts. More information can also be found in the Medium governance article and at https://viewer.diagrams.net/?highlight=0000ff&edit=_blank&layers=1&nav=1&title=tornado-cash-contract-overview.drawio#Uhttps%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRezan-vm%2Ftornado-cash-edu%2Fmain%2Ftornado-cash-contract-overview.drawio.
22. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to understand? (%)
All the contracts are immutable, and admin control information is well explained and documented.
23. Is there sufficient Pause Control documentation? (%)
There is a mention of the DAO being able to pause/unpause the TORN token in a proposal. In the event of a security incident, this proposal to pause the TORN token would have to undergo a 2 day timelock, where in the case of a critical bug, could result in a significant loss of funds while all TORN holders' hands are tied. However, the main contracts are clearly stated as immutable, which therefor means no party would have the admin ability to pause the contracts.
24. Is there sufficient Timelock documentation? (%)
The contracts are immutable, any and all new deployments through proposals are well documented to undergo a 2 day timelock.
25. Is the Timelock of an adequate length? (Y/N)
The timelock is exactly 48 hours.
This section goes over the documentation that a protocol may or may not supply about their Oracle usage. Oracles are a fundamental part of DeFi as they are responsible for relaying tons of price data information to thousands of protocols using blockchain technology. Not only are they important for price feeds, but they are also an essential component of transaction verification and security. This is explained in this document.
26. Is the protocol's Oracle sufficiently documented? (%)
Tornado Cash does not make use of oracles as you are not trading one asset against another asset. You simply deposit and withdraw the same amount of the same cryptocurrency.
27. Is front running mitigated by this protocol? (Y/N)
Due to the nature of the Tornado Cash protocol, it cannot be front run.
28. Can flashloan attacks be applied to the protocol, and if so, are those flashloan attack risks mitigated? (Y/N)
Flashloan attacks cannot be applied to Tornado Cash due to the fact that there are no native profit generating functions.
1pragma solidity ^0.5.8;
2
3
4
5contract IVerifier {
6 function verifyProof(bytes memory _proof, uint256[6] memory _input) public returns(bool);
7}
8
9contract Tornado is MerkleTreeWithHistory, ReentrancyGuard {
10 uint256 public denomination;
11 mapping(bytes32 => bool) public nullifierHashes;
12 // we store all commitments just to prevent accidental deposits with the same commitment
13 mapping(bytes32 => bool) public commitments;
14 IVerifier public verifier;
15
16 // operator can update snark verification key
17 // after the final trusted setup ceremony operator rights are supposed to be transferred to zero address
18 address public operator;
19 modifier onlyOperator {
20 require(msg.sender == operator, "Only operator can call this function.");
21 _;
22 }
23
24 event Deposit(bytes32 indexed commitment, uint32 leafIndex, uint256 timestamp);
25 event Withdrawal(address to, bytes32 nullifierHash, address indexed relayer, uint256 fee);
26
27 /**
28 @dev The constructor
29 @param _verifier the address of SNARK verifier for this contract
30 @param _denomination transfer amount for each deposit
31 @param _merkleTreeHeight the height of deposits' Merkle Tree
32 @param _operator operator address (see operator comment above)
33 */
34 constructor(
35 IVerifier _verifier,
36 uint256 _denomination,
37 uint32 _merkleTreeHeight,
38 address _operator
39 ) MerkleTreeWithHistory(_merkleTreeHeight) public {
40 require(_denomination > 0, "denomination should be greater than 0");
41 verifier = _verifier;
42 operator = _operator;
43 denomination = _denomination;
44 }
45
46 /**
47 @dev Deposit funds into the contract. The caller must send (for ETH) or approve (for ERC20) value equal to or `denomination` of this instance.
48 @param _commitment the note commitment, which is PedersenHash(nullifier + secret)
49 */
50 function deposit(bytes32 _commitment) external payable nonReentrant {
51 require(!commitments[_commitment], "The commitment has been submitted");
52
53 uint32 insertedIndex = _insert(_commitment);
54 commitments[_commitment] = true;
55 _processDeposit();
56
57 emit Deposit(_commitment, insertedIndex, block.timestamp);
58 }
59
60 /** @dev this function is defined in a child contract */
61 function _processDeposit() internal;
62
63 /**
64 @dev Withdraw a deposit from the contract. `proof` is a zkSNARK proof data, and input is an array of circuit public inputs
65 `input` array consists of:
66 - merkle root of all deposits in the contract
67 - hash of unique deposit nullifier to prevent double spends
68 - the recipient of funds
69 - optional fee that goes to the transaction sender (usually a relay)
70 */
71 function withdraw(bytes calldata _proof, bytes32 _root, bytes32 _nullifierHash, address payable _recipient, address payable _relayer, uint256 _fee, uint256 _refund) external payable nonReentrant {
72 require(_fee <= denomination, "Fee exceeds transfer value");
73 require(!nullifierHashes[_nullifierHash], "The note has been already spent");
74 require(isKnownRoot(_root), "Cannot find your merkle root"); // Make sure to use a recent one
75 require(verifier.verifyProof(_proof, [uint256(_root), uint256(_nullifierHash), uint256(_recipient), uint256(_relayer), _fee, _refund]), "Invalid withdraw proof");
76
77 nullifierHashes[_nullifierHash] = true;
78 _processWithdraw(_recipient, _relayer, _fee, _refund);
79 emit Withdrawal(_recipient, _nullifierHash, _relayer, _fee);
80 }
81
82 /** @dev this function is defined in a child contract */
83 function _processWithdraw(address payable _recipient, address payable _relayer, uint256 _fee, uint256 _refund) internal;
84
85 /** @dev whether a note is already spent */
86 function isSpent(bytes32 _nullifierHash) public view returns(bool) {
87 return nullifierHashes[_nullifierHash];
88 }
89
90 /** @dev whether an array of notes is already spent */
91 function isSpentArray(bytes32[] calldata _nullifierHashes) external view returns(bool[] memory spent) {
92 spent = new bool[](_nullifierHashes.length);
93 for(uint i = 0; i < _nullifierHashes.length; i++) {
94 if (isSpent(_nullifierHashes[i])) {
95 spent[i] = true;
96 }
97 }
98 }
99
100 /**
101 @dev allow operator to update SNARK verification keys. This is needed to update keys after the final trusted setup ceremony is held.
102 After that operator rights are supposed to be transferred to zero address
103 */
104 function updateVerifier(address _newVerifier) external onlyOperator {
105 verifier = IVerifier(_newVerifier);
106 }
107
108 /** @dev operator can change his address */
109 function changeOperator(address _newOperator) external onlyOperator {
110 operator = _newOperator;
111 }
112}
113
114// File: contracts/ETHTornado.sol
115
116// https://tornado.cash
117/*
118* d888888P dP a88888b. dP
119* 88 88 d8' `88 88
120* 88 .d8888b. 88d888b. 88d888b. .d8888b. .d888b88 .d8888b. 88 .d8888b. .d8888b. 88d888b.
121* 88 88' `88 88' `88 88' `88 88' `88 88' `88 88' `88 88 88' `88 Y8ooooo. 88' `88
122* 88 88. .88 88 88 88 88. .88 88. .88 88. .88 dP Y8. .88 88. .88 88 88 88
123* dP `88888P' dP dP dP `88888P8 `88888P8 `88888P' 88 Y88888P' `88888P8 `88888P' dP dP
124* ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
125*/
126
127pragma solidity ^0.5.8;
128
129
130contract TornadoCash_eth is Tornado {
131 constructor(
132 IVerifier _verifier,
133 uint256 _denomination,
134 uint32 _merkleTreeHeight,
135 address _operator
136 ) Tornado(_verifier, _denomination, _merkleTreeHeight, _operator) public {
137 }
138
139 function _processDeposit() internal {
140 require(msg.value == denomination, "Please send `mixDenomination` ETH along with transaction");
141 }
142
143 function _processWithdraw(address payable _recipient, address payable _relayer, uint256 _fee, uint256 _refund) internal {
144 // sanity checks
145 require(msg.value == 0, "Message value is supposed to be zero for ETH instance");
146 require(_refund == 0, "Refund value is supposed to be zero for ETH instance");
147
148 (bool success, ) = _recipient.call.value(denomination - _fee)("");
149 require(success, "payment to _recipient did not go thru");
150 if (_fee > 0) {
151 (success, ) = _relayer.call.value(_fee)("");
152 require(success, "payment to _relayer did not go thru");
153 }
Tests to Code: 949 / 461 = 206 %