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FAIL
Please note that ApolloX is a CEX-DEX hybrid, where the CEX component brings in risks that will not be considered in this report, as our process is tailored for decentralised protocols.
The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.
Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.
This section looks at the code deployed on the relevant chain that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.
1. Are the smart contract addresses easy to find? (%)
They can be found at https://apollox-finance.gitbook.io/apollox-finance/apx-token/apx-contract, as indicated in the Appendix. However, these contract addresses are only for the BnB deployments, with nothing for their Ethereum deployment. The lack of addresses for mainnet addresses motivate the halving of this score.
2. How active is the primary contract? (%)
Contract ApolloX Exchange Treasury Contract is used over 100 times a day, as indicated in the Appendix.
3. Does the protocol have a public software repository? (Y/N)
ApolloX's repository is located here. However, we definitely recommend adding a link to the repository on their main page, as I found this by looking at the API docs.
4. Is there a development history visible? (%)
There are 2 commits and 1 branch. This code was certainly not developed in this repository, this is simply used as a means to store and showcase the contracts.
5. Is the team public (not anonymous)?
The team can be found here on LinkedIn. However, they do not seem to have any developers as employees. Their only developer employee is pseudonymous, going by the name of Neptune. This is confusing and indicative of something greater.
This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
6. Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)
Location: https://apollox-finance.gitbook.io/apollox-finance/
7. Is the protocol's software architecture documented? (Y/N)
This protocol's software architecture is documented here. Although this gets full points, smart contract architecture diagrams require far more granularity that 2 arrows pointing into "smart contracts" and one going out to "decentralized wallet". There's 10 contracts per chain, and it would be nice to see how the contracts interact with one-another.
8. Does the software documentation fully cover the deployed contracts' source code? (%)
There is no software documentation for smart contracts, but their API is very well documented here.
9. Is it possible to trace the documented software to its implementation in the protocol's source code? (%)
There is no software documentation.
10. Has the protocol tested their deployed code? (%)
ApolloX does not have any public testing files.
11. How covered is the protocol's code? (%)
ApolloX provides no coverage report. Indeed, there is no proof of contract testing whatsoever.
12. Does the protocol provide scripts and instructions to run their tests? (Y/N)
ApolloX does not provide scripts or instructions to run their (absent) tests. Their repository is completely dead.
13. Is there a detailed report of the protocol's test results?(%)
There is no testing, even less a report of one.
14. Has the protocol undergone Formal Verification? (Y/N)
This protocol has not undergone formal verification.
15. Were the smart contracts deployed to a testnet? (Y/N)
There is no evidence of a testnet deployment. They appear to be using Ganache which creates a local fork of a network in order to run tests. However, without any proof of this we will not award points.
This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.
16. Is the protocol sufficiently audited? (%)
ApolloX was audited by Certik on January 27th 2022. This is confusing: their repository has not been updated since December of last year. As such, their deployed code is not the same is the code in their repository. We cannot identify that the contract that suffered an exploit was audited as a consequence of it being outside their public github repository. This audit returned one major severity issue and two minor severity issues. The major issue was partially resolved, and the minor ones were acknowledged. It appears that only the BNB Chain deployment was audited by CertiK, but the contracts have been deployed to Ethereum Mainnet also. This indicates poor due diligence because an audit that considers the strengths and weaknesses of one chain will not consider the strengths and weaknesses of another. We will thus score as if the audit indicates poor due diligence. It does.
17. Is the bounty value acceptably high (%)?
This protocol does not offer a bug bounty for software bugs.
This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.
18. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to find?
Admin control information is not documented, but ApolloX claims they will transition to a DAO governance model in 2022. The current status of admin controls is not identified. Nonetheless, we found ownership contracts in their repository which are undocumented.
19. Are relevant contracts clearly labelled as upgradeable or immutable? (%)
The upgradeability/immutability of contracts is not identified.
20. Is the type of smart contract ownership clearly indicated? (%)
Ownership for any contract is not indicated. An ownable.sol is indicated in their repository, This means that the contracts are owned by one entity. This is not documented anywhere.
21. Are the protocol's smart contract change capabilities described? (%)
Smart contract change capabilities are not identified.
22. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to understand? (%)
There is no admin control information, meaning no points can be awarded for ease of understanding.
23. Is there sufficient Pause Control documentation? (%)
There is no evidence of pause control use by this protocol. However, they state they use a pause function on a withdrawal contract when they detected their recent hack. Documentation would clear this confusion.
24. Is there sufficient Timelock documentation? (%)
There is no information pertaining to timelocks.
25. Is the Timelock of an adequate length? (Y/N)
There is no information pertaining to timelocks.
This section goes over the documentation that a protocol may or may not supply about their Oracle usage. Oracles are a fundamental part of DeFi as they are responsible for relaying tons of price data information to thousands of protocols using blockchain technology. Not only are they important for price feeds, but they are also an essential component of transaction verification and security. These questions are explained in this document.
26. Is the protocol's Oracle sufficiently documented? (%)
There is no oracle documentation, and there really should be. Protocols like ApolloX rely heavily on price feeds and there should be a high degree of transparency and risk-management when it comes to the integrity of these price feeds, especially considering ApolloX offers up to 150x leveraged positions. This is critical yet absent.
27. Is front running mitigated by this protocol? (Y/N)
We cannot identify whether front running is mitigated, however even if there is, it is not documented. More transparency about how price feeds are handled could potentially aid in documenting front running mitigation techniques. As a derivatives protocol, this information must be included.
28. Can flashloan attacks be applied to the protocol, and if so, are those flashloan attack risks mitigated? (Y/N)
There is no evidence or documentation of mitigation of price manipulation through flashloan attacks.
1pragma solidity ^0.5.16;
2
3import "./Ownable.sol";
4import "./ApolloxSafeMath.sol";
5import "./IERC20.sol";
6import "./SafeERC20.sol";
7import "./ECDSA.sol";
8
9pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
10
11contract ApolloxExchangeTreasury is Ownable {
12 using ApolloxSafeMath for uint;
13 using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
14
15 event ReceiveEther(uint amount);
16 event Claimed(uint256 indexed id, address indexed to, bool isETH, address currency, uint256 amount, uint256 deadline);
17 event TransferToCounterParty(bool isETH, address currency, uint256 amount);
18 event Paused();
19 event Unpaused();
20 event NewTruthHolder(address oldTruthHolder, address newTruthHolder);
21 event NewOperator(address oldOperator, address newOperator);
22 event NewCounterParty(address oldCounterParty, address newCounterParty);
23 event AddCurrency(address indexed currency);
24 event RemoveCurrency(address indexed currency);
25
26 bool public paused;
27 address public truthHolder;
28 address public operator;
29 address payable public counterParty;
30 mapping(address => bool) public supportCurrency;
31 mapping(uint => uint) public claimHistory;
32
33 modifier notPaused() {
34 require(!paused, "paused");
35 _;
36 }
37
38 modifier onlyOperator() {
39 require(msg.sender == operator, "only operator can call");
40 _;
41 }
42
43 constructor (address truthHolder_, address operator_, address payable counterParty_) public {
44 paused = false;
45 truthHolder = truthHolder_;
46 operator = operator_;
47 counterParty = counterParty_;
48 }
49
50 function() external payable {
51 if (msg.value > 0) {
52 emit ReceiveEther(msg.value);
53 }
54 }
55
56 function _transfer(address payable to, bool isETH, address currency, uint amount) internal {
57 if(isETH) {
58 require(address(this).balance >= amount, "not enough ether balance");
59 require(to.send(amount), "ether transfer failed");
60 } else {
61 IERC20 token = IERC20(currency);
62 uint balance = token.balanceOf(address(this));
63 require(balance >= amount, "not enough currency balance");
64 token.safeTransfer(to, amount);
65 }
66 }
67
68 function transferToCounterParty(bool isETH, address currency, uint amount) external onlyOperator {
69 _transfer(counterParty, isETH, currency, amount);
70 emit TransferToCounterParty(isETH, currency, amount);
71 }
72
73 function claim(bytes calldata message, bytes calldata signature) external notPaused {
74 address source = source(message, signature);
75 require(source == truthHolder, "only accept truthHolder signed message");
76
77 (uint256 id, address payable to, bool isETH, address currency, uint256 amount, uint256 deadline) = abi.decode(message, (uint256, address, bool, address, uint256, uint256));
78 require(claimHistory[id] == 0, "already claimed");
79 require(isETH || supportCurrency[currency], "currency not support");
80 require(block.timestamp < deadline, "already passed deadline");
81
82 claimHistory[id] = block.number;
83 _transfer(to, isETH, currency, amount);
84 emit Claimed(id, to, isETH, currency, amount, deadline);
85 }
86
87 function source(bytes memory message, bytes memory signature) public pure returns (address) {
88 bytes32 hash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32", keccak256(message)));
89 return ECDSA.recover(hash, signature);
90 }
91
92 function _pause() external onlyOwner {
93 paused = true;
94 emit Paused();
95 }
96
97 function _unpause() external onlyOwner {
98 paused = false;
99 emit Unpaused();
100 }
101
102 function _changeTruthHolder(address newTruthHolder) external onlyOwner {
103 address oldHolder = truthHolder;
104 truthHolder = newTruthHolder;
105 emit NewTruthHolder(oldHolder, newTruthHolder);
106 }
107
108 function _setOperator(address newOperator) external onlyOwner {
109 address oldOperator = operator;
110 operator = newOperator;
111 emit NewOperator(oldOperator, newOperator);
112 }
113
114 function _setCounterParty(address payable newCounterParty) external onlyOwner {
115 address payable oldCounterParty = counterParty;
116 counterParty = newCounterParty;
117 emit NewCounterParty(oldCounterParty, newCounterParty);
118 }
119
120 function _addCurrency(address currency) external onlyOwner {
121 supportCurrency[currency] = true;
122 emit AddCurrency(currency);
123 }
124
125 function _removeCurrency(address currency) external onlyOwner {
126 delete supportCurrency[currency];
127 emit RemoveCurrency(currency);
128 }
129