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PASS
The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.
Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.
This section looks at the code deployed on the relevant chain that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.
1. Are the smart contract addresses easy to find? (%)
Lido's smart contract addresses can be found at https://docs.lido.fi/deployed-contracts, as indicated in the Appendix.
2. How active is the primary contract? (%)
Contract DepositSecurityModule.sol is used on average 10 times a day, as indicated in the Appendix.
3. Does the protocol have a public software repository? (Y/N)
Location: https://github.com/lidofinance/lido-dao
4. Is there a development history visible? (%)
With 1,243 commits and 68 branches, Lido's main software repository is liquid gold.
5. Is the team public (not anonymous)?
Many public contributors can be found in Lido's GitHub at https://github.com/lidofinance/lido-dao/graphs/contributors.
This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
6. Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)
Location: https://docs.lido.fi/
7. Is the protocol's software architecture documented? (Y/N)
Lido's software architecture is documented in https://docs.lido.fi/contracts/lido.
8. Does the software documentation fully cover the deployed contracts' source code? (%)
There is full coverage of Lido's most major deployed contracts by software function documentation. However, there are clearly a few missing as per their "Deployed Contracts" page.
9. Is it possible to trace the documented software to its implementation in the protocol's source code? (%)
Lido provides direct and explicit traceability for all their key smart contracts. This can be seen as links that lead directly to a smart contract's source code, easily available at the top of each contract's page in the Lido docs.
10. Has the protocol tested their deployed code? (%)
Code examples are in the Appendix at the end of this report.. As per the SLOC, there is 506% testing to code (TtC). This score is guided by the Test to Code ratio (TtC). Generally a good test to code ratio is over 100%. However, the reviewer's best judgement is the final deciding factor.
11. How covered is the protocol's code? (%)
Lido's last code coverage test was run around 7 days ago at the time of writing this review, and can be found here (must be signed in to GitHub to view). The average result is 82% coverage.
12. Does the protocol provide scripts and instructions to run their tests? (Y/N)
Scripts/Instructions location: https://github.com/lidofinance/lido-dao/tree/master/scripts
13. Is there a detailed report of the protocol's test results?(%)
Lido has a very in-depth CI suite within the "Actions" tab of their LidoDAO software repository. It can be viewed here, but detailed logs can only be viewed once signed in.
14. Has the protocol undergone Formal Verification? (Y/N)
Lido has not undergone formal verification.
15. Were the smart contracts deployed to a testnet? (Y/N)
Lido has been deployed to multiple testnets.
This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.
16. Is the protocol sufficiently audited? (%)
Lido has been audited mutliple times pre and post deployment by MixBytes, SigmaPrime, and Quantstamp. Most issues underlined by the audit reports were fixed by the Lido team.
17. Is the bounty value acceptably high (%)
Lido offer three separate Immunefi bug bounties for three different chain deployments. All three offer rewards up to $2m, totaling $6m. Their mainnet program can be found here
This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.
18. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to find?
Lido's admin control information is easily found and readily available in their docs.
19. Are relevant contracts clearly labelled as upgradeable or immutable? (%)
Lido uses an upgradeable proxy structure that allows their immutable smart contracts to update the state of these proxies. Since the implementation/logic/code that holds user funds is effectively immutable, and all upgrades are surface level parameter changes that must be voted on, we consider Lido as immutable and non-custodial - 100%. These details can be found here and here.
20. Is the type of smart contract ownership clearly indicated? (%)
21. Are the protocol's smart contract change capabilities described? (%)
All possible smart contract change capabilities of the Lido software is detailed here. A detailed list of parameters that can be voted upon by the DAO can be found in their Aragorn DAO interface.
22. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to understand? (%)
Lido's admin control information clearly details their admin functions, but in software-related information that does not pertain to user investment safety.
23. Is there sufficient Pause Control documentation? (%)
Lido's pausing capabilities are clearly and extensively detailed here.
24. Is there sufficient Timelock documentation? (%)
A timelock is identified here, but is not extensively detailed.
25. Is the Timelock of an adequate length? (Y/N)
The Lido timelock enforces a 72h lockup period.
This section goes over the documentation that a protocol may or may not supply about their Oracle usage. Oracles are a fundamental part of DeFi as they are responsible for relaying tons of price data information to thousands of protocols using blockchain technology. Not only are they important for price feeds, but they are also an essential component of transaction verification and security. These questions are explained in this document.
26. Is the protocol's Oracle sufficiently documented? (%)
27. Is front running mitigated by this protocol? (Y/N)
Lido details their oracle's capabilities to "remove the ability to significantly change the price in a single block" here. Lido effectively does this by using "daemon oracles: that report to their overarching LidoOracle contract. This architecture effectively removes incentives from attempting sandwich/front running attacks by increasing the amount of data sources that would need to be exploited, which therefore makes it computationally intensive and expensive.
28. Can flashloan attacks be applied to the protocol, and if so, are those flashloan attack risks mitigated? (Y/N)
Lido applies the same architecture they use for mitigating sandwich attacks via oracles to their flash loan mitigation strategy. "Lido details their oracle's capabilities to "remove the ability to significantly change the price in a single block" here. Lido effectively does this by using "daemon oracles: that report to their overarching LidoOracle contract. This architecture effectively removes incentives from attempting sandwich/front running attacks by increasing the amount of data sources that would need to be exploited, which therefore makes it computationally intensive and expensive."
1/**
2* @title Liquid staking pool implementation
3*
4* Lido is an Ethereum 2.0 liquid staking protocol solving the problem of frozen staked Ethers
5* until transfers become available in Ethereum 2.0.
6* Whitepaper: https://lido.fi/static/Lido:Ethereum-Liquid-Staking.pdf
7*
8* NOTE: the code below assumes moderate amount of node operators, e.g. up to 50.
9*
10* Since balances of all token holders change when the amount of total pooled Ether
11* changes, this token cannot fully implement ERC20 standard: it only emits `Transfer`
12* events upon explicit transfer between holders. In contrast, when Lido oracle reports
13* rewards, no Transfer events are generated: doing so would require emitting an event
14* for each token holder and thus running an unbounded loop.
15*/
16contract Lido is ILido, IsContract, StETH, AragonApp {
17 using SafeMath for uint256;
18 using SafeMath64 for uint64;
19 using UnstructuredStorage for bytes32;
20
21 /// ACL
22 bytes32 constant public PAUSE_ROLE = keccak256("PAUSE_ROLE");
23 bytes32 constant public MANAGE_FEE = keccak256("MANAGE_FEE");
24 bytes32 constant public MANAGE_WITHDRAWAL_KEY = keccak256("MANAGE_WITHDRAWAL_KEY");
25 bytes32 constant public SET_ORACLE = keccak256("SET_ORACLE");
26 bytes32 constant public BURN_ROLE = keccak256("BURN_ROLE");
27 bytes32 constant public SET_TREASURY = keccak256("SET_TREASURY");
28 bytes32 constant public SET_INSURANCE_FUND = keccak256("SET_INSURANCE_FUND");
29 bytes32 constant public DEPOSIT_ROLE = keccak256("DEPOSIT_ROLE");
30
31 uint256 constant public PUBKEY_LENGTH = 48;
32 uint256 constant public WITHDRAWAL_CREDENTIALS_LENGTH = 32;
33 uint256 constant public SIGNATURE_LENGTH = 96;
34
35 uint256 constant public DEPOSIT_SIZE = 32 ether;
36
37 uint256 internal constant DEPOSIT_AMOUNT_UNIT = 1000000000 wei;
38
39 /// @dev default value for maximum number of Ethereum 2.0 validators registered in a single depositBufferedEther call
40 uint256 internal constant DEFAULT_MAX_DEPOSITS_PER_CALL = 150;
41
42 bytes32 internal constant FEE_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.fee");
43 bytes32 internal constant TREASURY_FEE_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.treasuryFee");
44 bytes32 internal constant INSURANCE_FEE_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.insuranceFee");
45 bytes32 internal constant NODE_OPERATORS_FEE_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.nodeOperatorsFee");
46
47 bytes32 internal constant DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.depositContract");
48 bytes32 internal constant ORACLE_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.oracle");
49 bytes32 internal constant NODE_OPERATORS_REGISTRY_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.nodeOperatorsRegistry");
50 bytes32 internal constant TREASURY_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.treasury");
51 bytes32 internal constant INSURANCE_FUND_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.insuranceFund");
52
53 /// @dev amount of Ether (on the current Ethereum side) buffered on this smart contract balance
54 bytes32 internal constant BUFFERED_ETHER_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.bufferedEther");
55 /// @dev number of deposited validators (incrementing counter of deposit operations).
56 bytes32 internal constant DEPOSITED_VALIDATORS_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.depositedValidators");
57 /// @dev total amount of Beacon-side Ether (sum of all the balances of Lido validators)
58 bytes32 internal constant BEACON_BALANCE_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.beaconBalance");
59 /// @dev number of Lido's validators available in the Beacon state
60 bytes32 internal constant BEACON_VALIDATORS_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.beaconValidators");
61
62 /// @dev Credentials which allows the DAO to withdraw Ether on the 2.0 side
63 bytes32 internal constant WITHDRAWAL_CREDENTIALS_POSITION = keccak256("lido.Lido.withdrawalCredentials");
64
65 /**
66 * @dev As AragonApp, Lido contract must be initialized with following variables:
67 * @param depositContract official ETH2 Deposit contract
68 * @param _oracle oracle contract
69 * @param _operators instance of Node Operators Registry
70 */
71 function initialize(
72 IDepositContract depositContract,
73 address _oracle,
74 INodeOperatorsRegistry _operators,
75 address _treasury,
76 address _insuranceFund
77 )
78 public onlyInit
79 {
80 _setDepositContract(depositContract);
81 _setOracle(_oracle);
82 _setOperators(_operators);
83 _setTreasury(_treasury);
84 _setInsuranceFund(_insuranceFund);
85
86 initialized();
87 }
88
89 /**
90 * @notice Send funds to the pool
91 * @dev Users are able to submit their funds by transacting to the fallback function.
92 * Unlike vanilla Eth2.0 Deposit contract, accepting only 32-Ether transactions, Lido
93 * accepts payments of any size. Submitted Ethers are stored in Buffer until someone calls
94 * depositBufferedEther() and pushes them to the ETH2 Deposit contract.
95 */
96 function() external payable {
97 // protection against accidental submissions by calling non-existent function
98 require(msg.data.length == 0, "NON_EMPTY_DATA");
99 _submit(0);
100 }
101
102 /**
103 * @notice Send funds to the pool with optional _referral parameter
104 * @dev This function is alternative way to submit funds. Supports optional referral address.
105 * @return Amount of StETH shares generated
106 */
107 function submit(address _referral) external payable returns (uint256) {
108 return _submit(_referral);
109 }
110
111 /**
112 * @notice Deposits buffered ethers to the official DepositContract.
113 * @dev This function is separated from submit() to reduce the cost of sending funds.
114 */
115 function depositBufferedEther() external auth(DEPOSIT_ROLE) {
116 return _depositBufferedEther(DEFAULT_MAX_DEPOSITS_PER_CALL);
117 }
118
119 /**
120 * @notice Deposits buffered ethers to the official DepositContract, making no more than `_maxDeposits` deposit calls.
121 * @dev This function is separated from submit() to reduce the cost of sending funds.
122 */
123 function depositBufferedEther(uint256 _maxDeposits) external auth(DEPOSIT_ROLE) {
124 return _depositBufferedEther(_maxDeposits);
125 }
126
127 function burnShares(address _account, uint256 _sharesAmount)
128 external
129 authP(BURN_ROLE, arr(_account, _sharesAmount))
130 returns (uint256 newTotalShares)
131 {
132 return _burnShares(_account, _sharesAmount);
133 }
134
135 /**
136 * @notice Stop pool routine operations
137 */
138 function stop() external auth(PAUSE_ROLE) {
139 _stop();
140 }
141
142 /**
143 * @notice Resume pool routine operations
144 */
145 function resume() external auth(PAUSE_ROLE) {
146 _resume();
147 }
Tests to Code: 6787 / 1341 = 506 %