If you notice some outdated information please let us know!
FAIL
The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.
Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.
This section looks at the code deployed on the relevant chain that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.
1. Are the smart contract addresses easy to find? (%)
They can be found at https://stakedao.gitbook.io/stakedaohq/platform/deployed-contracts, as indicated in the Appendix.
2. How active is the primary contract? (%)
Contract MasterChef is used 10 times a day, as indicated in the Appendix.
3. Does the protocol have a public software repository? (Y/N)
https://github.com/StakeDAO
4. Is there a development history visible? (%)
At just 12 commits in their stablecoin-rewards repo, there is not good evidence of a strong development history. This protocol's GitHub repository needs overhauling and is very difficult to navigate.
5. Is the team public (not anonymous)?
Julien Bouteloup is the only public developer of StakeDAO.
The difference between this and the old link is solely the link. This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
6. Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)
Location: https://stakedao.gitbook.io/stakedaohq/
7. Is the protocol's software architecture documented? (Y/N)
This protocol's software architecture is documented here.
8. Does the software documentation fully cover the deployed contracts' source code? (%)
There is no coverage of deployed contracts by software function documentation.
9. Is it possible to trace the documented software to its implementation in the protocol's source code? (%)
There is explicit traceability towards StakeDAO's source code, but there are currently no software functions documented.
10. Has the protocol tested their deployed code? (%)
This question's score is guided by our Test to Code (TtC) ratio which can be found in the Appendix at the end of this review. TtC: 12,077 / 7,835 = 154%
11. How covered is the protocol's code? (%)
There is no evidence of code coverage testing. However, SakeDAO does have robust testing.
12. Does the protocol provide scripts and instructions to run their tests? (Y/N)
Scripts/Instructions location: https://github.com/StakeDAO/brownie
13. Is there a detailed report of the protocol's test results?(%)
There is no report.
14. Has the protocol undergone Formal Verification? (Y/N)
This protocol has not undergone formal verification.
15. Were the smart contracts deployed to a testnet? (Y/N)
StakeDAO documents their deployment to the Ganache testnet here.
This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.
16. Is the protocol sufficiently audited? (%)
This protocol has not documented an audit.
17. Is the bounty value acceptably high (%)
This protocol offers no bug bounty .
This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.
18. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to find?
Admin control information can easily be found here.
19. Are relevant contracts clearly labelled as upgradeable or immutable? (%)
The StakeDAO smart contracts' state variables are immutable, therefore disabling admin ownership of any kind of user funds or information.
20. Is the type of smart contract ownership clearly indicated? (%)
The ownership of StakeDAO's deployer smart contracts and a MultiSig are clearly detailed in their Admin Control documentation. In addition, decentralized DAO information can be found here.
21. Are the protocol's smart contract change capabilities described? (%)
The StakeDAO smart contracts' change capabilities are detailed in their Admin Control documentation. This includes: - Deployer address can change smart contract connections - Deployed can call harvest() - MultiSig can control SDT inflation via the MasterChef - MasterChef features and incentives can be tweaked and passed through a Timelock
22. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to understand? (%)
Admin Control information is written is user-friendly language and related to the user funds' safety.
23. Is there sufficient Pause Control documentation? (%)
StakeDAO's lack of a Pause Control is explained in their GitHub documentation. In addition, the absence of a Pause function can be excused by the fact that the protocol's smart contract state variables are currently immutable.
24. Is there sufficient Timelock documentation? (%)
StakeDAO adequately documents their timelock here.
25. Is the Timelock of an adequate length? (Y/N)
StakeDAO's timelock has a length of 8h, and the reasons why are explained here.
This section goes over the documentation that a protocol may or may not supply about their Oracle usage. Oracles are a fundamental part of DeFi as they are responsible for relaying tons of price data information to thousands of protocols using blockchain technology. Not only are they important for price feeds, but they are also an essential component of transaction verification and security. This is explained in this document.
26. Is the protocol's Oracle sufficiently documented? (%)
The protocol's oracle source is documented. There is basic software function documentation linked to Rari's Fuse Pool (their oracle of choice). The reason that this oracle was selected is identified.
27. Is front running mitigated by this protocol? (Y/N)
Front running mitigation lies within the underlying software design of StakeDAO, as their core strategies' APY aren't really affected by the order of transactions in the mempool. Front running transactions therefore becomes a fruitless endeavor.
28. Can flashloan attacks be applied to the protocol, and if so, are those flashloan attack risks mitigated? (Y/N)
This protocol documents flashloan countermeasures via withdrawal fees in their documentation.
1*Submitted for verification at Etherscan.io on 2021-01-20
2*/
3
4// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
5
6pragma solidity 0.6.12;
7
8
9
10// Part: Address
11
12/**
13 * @dev Collection of functions related to the address type
14 */
15library Address {
16 /**
17 * @dev Returns true if `account` is a contract.
18 *
19 * [IMPORTANT]
20 * ====
21 * It is unsafe to assume that an address for which this function returns
22 * false is an externally-owned account (EOA) and not a contract.
23 *
24 * Among others, `isContract` will return false for the following
25 * types of addresses:
26 *
27 * - an externally-owned account
28 * - a contract in construction
29 * - an address where a contract will be created
30 * - an address where a contract lived, but was destroyed
31 * ====
32 */
33 function isContract(address account) internal view returns (bool) {
34 // This method relies on extcodesize, which returns 0 for contracts in
35 // construction, since the code is only stored at the end of the
36 // constructor execution.
37
38 uint256 size;
39 // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
40 assembly {
41 size := extcodesize(account)
42 }
43 return size > 0;
44 }
45
46 /**
47 * @dev Replacement for Solidity's `transfer`: sends `amount` wei to
48 * `recipient`, forwarding all available gas and reverting on errors.
49 *
50 * https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1884[EIP1884] increases the gas cost
51 * of certain opcodes, possibly making contracts go over the 2300 gas limit
52 * imposed by `transfer`, making them unable to receive funds via
53 * `transfer`. {sendValue} removes this limitation.
54 *
55 * https://diligence.consensys.net/posts/2019/09/stop-using-soliditys-transfer-now/[Learn more].
56 *
57 * IMPORTANT: because control is transferred to `recipient`, care must be
58 * taken to not create reentrancy vulnerabilities. Consider using
59 * {ReentrancyGuard} or the
60 * https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.11/security-considerations.html#use-the-checks-effects-interactions-pattern[checks-effects-interactions pattern].
61 */
62 function sendValue(address payable recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
63 require(
64 address(this).balance >= amount,
65 "Address: insufficient balance"
66 );
67
68 // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls, avoid-call-value
69 (bool success, ) = recipient.call{value: amount}("");
70 require(
71 success,
72 "Address: unable to send value, recipient may have reverted"
73 );
74 }
75
76 /**
77 * @dev Performs a Solidity function call using a low level `call`. A
78 * plain`call` is an unsafe replacement for a function call: use this
79 * function instead.
80 *
81 * If `target` reverts with a revert reason, it is bubbled up by this
82 * function (like regular Solidity function calls).
83 *
84 * Returns the raw returned data. To convert to the expected return value,
85 * use https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/units-and-global-variables.html?highlight=abi.decode#abi-encoding-and-decoding-functions[`abi.decode`].
86 *
87 * Requirements:
88 *
89 * - `target` must be a contract.
90 * - calling `target` with `data` must not revert.
91 *
92 * _Available since v3.1._
93 */
94 function functionCall(address target, bytes memory data)
95 internal
96 returns (bytes memory)
97 {
98 return functionCall(target, data, "Address: low-level call failed");
99 }
100
101 /**
102 * @dev Same as {xref-Address-functionCall-address-bytes-}[`functionCall`], but with
103 * `errorMessage` as a fallback revert reason when `target` reverts.
104 *
105 * _Available since v3.1._
106 */
107 function functionCall(
108 address target,
109 bytes memory data,
110 string memory errorMessage
111 ) internal returns (bytes memory) {
112 return functionCallWithValue(target, data, 0, errorMessage);
113 }
114
115 /**
116 * @dev Same as {xref-Address-functionCall-address-bytes-}[`functionCall`],
117 * but also transferring `value` wei to `target`.
118 *
119 * Requirements:
120 *
121 * - the calling contract must have an ETH balance of at least `value`.
122 * - the called Solidity function must be `payable`.
123 *
124 * _Available since v3.1._
125 */
126 function functionCallWithValue(
127 address target,
128 bytes memory data,
129 uint256 value
130 ) internal returns (bytes memory) {
131 return
132 functionCallWithValue(
133 target,
134 data,
135 value,
136 "Address: low-level call with value failed"
137 );
138 }
139
140 /**
141 * @dev Same as {xref-Address-functionCallWithValue-address-bytes-uint256-}[`functionCallWithValue`], but
142 * with `errorMessage` as a fallback revert reason when `target` reverts.
143 *
144 * _Available since v3.1._
145 */
146 function functionCallWithValue(
147 address target,
148 bytes memory data,
149 uint256 value,
150 string memory errorMessage
151 ) internal returns (bytes memory) {
152 require(
153 address(this).balance >= value,
154 "Address: insufficient balance for call"
155 );
156 require(isContract(target), "Address: call to non-contract");
157
158 // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
159 (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target.call{value: value}(
160 data
161 );
162 return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
163 }
164
165 /**
166 * @dev Same as {xref-Address-functionCall-address-bytes-}[`functionCall`],
167 * but performing a static call.
168 *
169 * _Available since v3.3._
170 */
171 function functionStaticCall(address target, bytes memory data)
172 internal
173 view
174 returns (bytes memory)
175 {
176 return
177 functionStaticCall(
178 target,
179 data,
180 "Address: low-level static call failed"
181 );
182 }
183
184 /**
185 * @dev Same as {xref-Address-functionCall-address-bytes-string-}[`functionCall`],
186 * but performing a static call.
187 *
188 * _Available since v3.3._
189 */
190 function functionStaticCall(
191 address target,
192 bytes memory data,
193 string memory errorMessage
194 ) internal view returns (bytes memory) {
195 require(isContract(target), "Address: static call to non-contract");
196
197 // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
198 (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target.staticcall(data);
199 return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
200 }
201
202 /**
203 * @dev Same as {xref-Address-functionCall-address-bytes-}[`functionCall`],
204 * but performing a delegate call.
205 *
206 * _Available since v3.3._
207 */
208 function functionDelegateCall(address target, bytes memory data)
209 internal
210 returns (bytes memory)
211 {
212 return
213 functionDelegateCall(
214 target,
215 data,
216 "Address: low-level delegate call failed"
217 );
218 }
219
220 /**
221 * @dev Same as {xref-Address-functionCall-address-bytes-string-}[`functionCall`],
222 * but performing a delegate call.
223 *
224 * _Available since v3.3._
225 */
226 function functionDelegateCall(
227 address target,
228 bytes memory data,
229 string memory errorMessage
230 ) internal returns (bytes memory) {
231 require(isContract(target), "Address: delegate call to non-contract");
232
233 // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
234 (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target.delegatecall(data);
235 return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
236 }