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PASS
The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.
Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.
This section looks at the code deployed on the Mainnet that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.
1. Are the executing code addresses readily available? (%)
They are available at website https://badger.wiki/addresses, as indicated in the Appendix.
2. Is the code actively being used? (%)
Activity is 260 transactions a day on contract 0x3472A5A71965499acd81997a54BBA8D852C6E53d, as indicated in the Appendix.
3. Is there a public software repository? (Y/N)
GitHub: https://github.com/Badger-Finance/.
Is there a public software repository with the code at a minimum, but also normally test and scripts. Even if the repository was created just to hold the files and has just 1 transaction, it gets a "Yes". For teams with private repositories, this answer is "No"
4. Is there a development history visible? (%)
An astonishing 1059 commits paired with 103 branches make BadgerDAO's development history exceptionally rich.
This metric checks if the software repository demonstrates a strong steady history. This is normally demonstrated by commits, branches and releases in a software repository. A healthy history demonstrates a history of more than a month (at a minimum).
5. Is the team public (not anonymous)? (Y/N)
Location: https://badger.wiki/badger
For a "Yes" in this question, the real names of some team members must be public on the website or other documentation (LinkedIn, etc). If the team is anonymous, then this question is a "No".
This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
6. Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)
7. Are the basic software functions documented? (Y/N)
All basic software functions are documented under the "Developer Info" subheading.
8. Does the software function documentation fully (100%) cover the deployed contracts? (%)
The most important deployed contracts are covered in the "Developer Info" section of their documentation.
9. Are there sufficiently detailed comments for all functions within the deployed contract code (%)
The Comments to Code (CtC) ratio is the primary metric for this score.
10. Is it possible to trace from software documentation to the implementation in code (%)
Documentation covers some of the BadgerDao code, but almost all functions are non-explicitly traceable to their source code.
11. Full test suite (Covers all the deployed code) (%)
This score is guided by the Test to Code ratio (TtC). Generally a good test to code ratio is over 100%. However the reviewers best judgement is the final deciding factor.
12. Code coverage (Covers all the deployed lines of code, or explains misses) (%)
An audit conducted in August 2021 found 43.78% of Badger Finance's deployed code to be covered. In additon, the Zokyo audit has performed a code coverage test that returned an average of around 55%.
13. Scripts and instructions to run the tests? (Y/N)
Scripts/Instructions location: https://github.com/Badger-Finance/badger-system/tree/multichain
14. Report of the results (%)
No test result was found.
15. Formal Verification test done (%)
Badger Finance has not undergone a formal verification test.
16. Stress Testing environment (%)
Badger Finance launches new vaults with stringent limits for an initial testing period to allow for bugs to be fixed before these vaults are open to the general public. There is also clear evidence of Rinkeby testnet usage at https://github.com/Badger-Finance/badger-system/blob/master/badger-rinkeby.json.
This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.
17. Did 3rd Party audits take place? (%)
Four different audits have taken place in the past year, all of which are public, and have been published pre-mainnet launch. - The Zokyo audit found that BadgerDAO was very secure and well-written. The only issue that was underlined in the report was an informational language usage flag in the Badger code. Essentially, they use internal functions for modifier roles in some of their contracts, but they should just use modifiers instead. Overall, Zokyo found nothing that could actively pose a risk to the smart contracts' integrity. - The Haechi audit found several minor and informational issues for the Badger team to work on. Unfortunately, there is no indication as to what the team did to resolve them. The underlined issues include a StakingReward bug where the contract's notifyRewardAmount() function would not check if it received rewards. This could lead to higher rewards for more active stakers, and potentially no rewards for others. In the same contract, another bug includes the notifyRewardAmount() function, where users could potentially be subjected to lower rewards rates. These are the most important findings, and all the other ones touch upon the language use and how it can be optimized. - The audit performed by Defi Yield did not find any issues. Rather, the report's only recommendations were to change the Controller and Sett contracts' governance addresses to "real" governance addresses. This would imply that both of these contracts are not linked to the actual BadgerDAO governance addresses. - The Quantstamp audit report unveiled multiple issues. Several of them were of medium risk, and one of them was high risk. The issue is that most of them, including the high-risk one, are not yet resolved. The high risk issue comprises the fact that the Core Badger contract has unbounded trust in its peaks. Peaks, as defined by the Badger documentation, are any third-party integration within the protocol. The issue here is that these peak contracts are telling the Core contract how many tokens to redeem, mint, or burn without limits or any form of verification. This means that any malicious peak contract could completely mess with the overrall Badger token integrity. As this issue is yet unresolved, this poses a serious problem. All other mentionned issues are either medium, low, or of unknown risk, and mostly affect the Core contract.
18. Is the bug bounty acceptable high? (%)
Badger Finance has a $750k active bug bounty program.
This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.
19. Can a user clearly and quickly find the status of the access controls (%)
The access controls are clearly outlined under the security section of their website.
20. Is the information clear and complete (%)
a) All contracts are clearly labelled as upgradeable (or not) -- 20% -- all important contracts are clearly labelled as upgradeable in a governance proposal, though not all deployed contracts are covered. b) The type of ownership is clearly indicated (OnlyOwner / MultiSig / Defined Roles) -- 30% -- the ownership is clearly outlined in both the security section of their website and in the previous governance proposal. c) The capabilities for change in the contracts are described -- 30% -- contract upgradeability is identified in the security pages.
21. Is the information in non-technical terms that pertain to the investments (%)
Description of admin controls is in clear and non-technical terms, and relates to user funds' safety.
22. Is there Pause Control documentation including records of tests (%)
The documents mentions a "guardian" capable of pausing the protocol, but there is little elaboration.
1contract BadgerBridgeAdapter is OwnableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable {
2 using SafeMathUpgradeable for uint256;
3 using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
4
5 IERC20 public renBTC;
6 IERC20 public wBTC;
7
8 // RenVM gateway registry.
9 IGatewayRegistry public registry;
10 // Swap router that handles swap routing optimizations.
11 ISwapStrategyRouter public router;
12
13 event RecoverStuck(uint256 amount, uint256 fee);
14 event Mint(uint256 renbtc_minted, uint256 wbtc_swapped, uint256 fee);
15 event Burn(uint256 renbtc_burned, uint256 wbtc_transferred, uint256 fee);
16 event SwapError(bytes error);
17
18 address public rewards;
19 address public governance;
20
21 uint256 public mintFeeBps;
22 uint256 public burnFeeBps;
23 uint256 private percentageFeeRewardsBps;
24 uint256 private percentageFeeGovernanceBps;
25
26 uint256 public constant MAX_BPS = 10000;
27
28 mapping(address => bool) public approvedVaults;
29
30 // Configurable permissionless curve lp token wrapper.
31 address curveTokenWrapper;
32
33 // Make struct for mint args, otherwise too many local vars (stack too deep).
34 struct MintArguments {
35 uint256 _mintAmount;
36 uint256 _mintAmountMinusFee;
37 uint256 _fee;
38 uint256 _slippage;
39 address _vault;
40 address _user;
41 address _token;
42 }
43
44 function initialize(
45 address _governance,
46 address _rewards,
47 address _registry,
48 address _router,
49 address _wbtc,
50 uint256[4] memory _feeConfig
51 ) public initializer {
52 __Ownable_init();
53 __ReentrancyGuard_init();
54
55 require(_governance != address(0x0), "must set governance address");
56 require(_rewards != address(0x0), "must set rewards address");
57 require(_registry != address(0x0), "must set registry address");
58 require(_router != address(0x0), "must set router address");
59 require(_wbtc != address(0x0), "must set wBTC address");
60
61 governance = _governance;
62 rewards = _rewards;
63
64 registry = IGatewayRegistry(_registry);
65 router = ISwapStrategyRouter(_router);
66 renBTC = registry.getTokenBySymbol("BTC");
67 wBTC = IERC20(_wbtc);
68
69 mintFeeBps = _feeConfig[0];
70 burnFeeBps = _feeConfig[1];
71 percentageFeeRewardsBps = _feeConfig[2];
72 percentageFeeGovernanceBps = _feeConfig[3];
73 }
74
75 function version() external pure returns (string memory) {
76 return "1.1";
77 }
78
79 // NB: This recovery fn only works for the BTC gateway (hardcoded and only one supported in this adapter).
80 function recoverStuck(
81 // encoded user args
82 bytes calldata encoded,
83 // darkdnode args
84 uint256 _amount,
85 bytes32 _nHash,
86 bytes calldata _sig
87 ) external nonReentrant {
88 // Ensure sender matches sender of original tx.
89 uint256 start = encoded.length - 32;
90 address sender = abi.decode(encoded[start:], (address));
91 require(sender == msg.sender);
92
93 bytes32 pHash = keccak256(encoded);
94 uint256 _mintAmount = registry.getGatewayBySymbol("BTC").mint(pHash, _amount, _nHash, _sig);
95 uint256 _fee = _processFee(renBTC, _mintAmount, mintFeeBps);
96
97 emit RecoverStuck(_mintAmount, _fee);
98
99 renBTC.safeTransfer(msg.sender, _mintAmount.sub(_fee));
100 }
101
102 function mint(
103 // user args
104 address _token, // either renBTC or wBTC
105 uint256 _slippage,
106 address _user,
107 address _vault,
108 / darknode args
109 uint256 _amount,
110 bytes32 _nHash,
111 bytes calldata _sig
112 ) external nonReentrant {
113 require(_token == address(renBTC) || _token == address(wBTC), "invalid token address");
114
115 / Mint renBTC tokens
116 bytes32 pHash = keccak256(abi.encode(_token, _slippage, _user, _vault));
117 uint256 mintAmount = registry.getGatewayBySymbol("BTC").mint(pHash, _amount, _nHash, _sig);
118
119 require(mintAmount > 0, "zero mint amount");
120
121 uint256 fee = _processFee(renBTC, mintAmount, mintFeeBps);
122 uint256 mintAmountMinusFee = mintAmount.sub(fee);
123
124 MintArguments memory args = MintArguments(mintAmount, mintAmountMinusFee, fee, _slippage, _vault, _user, _token);
125 bool success = mintAdapter(args);
126
127 if (!success) {
128 renBTC.safeTransfer(_user, mintAmountMinusFee);
129 }
130 }
131
132 function burn(
133 // user args
134 address _token, // either renBTC or wBTC
135 address _vault,
136 uint256 _slippage,
137 bytes calldata _btcDestination,
138 uint256 _amount
139 ) external nonReentrant {
140 require(_token == address(renBTC) || _token == address(wBTC), "invalid token address");
141 require(!(_vault != address(0) && !approvedVaults[_vault]), "Vault not approved");
142
143 bool isVault = _vault != address(0);
144 bool isRenBTC = _token == address(renBTC);
145 IERC20 token = isRenBTC ? renBTC : wBTC;
146 uint256 startBalanceRenBTC = renBTC.balanceOf(address(this));
147 uint256 startBalanceWBTC = wBTC.balanceOf(address(this));
148
149 // Vaults can require up to two levels of unwrapping.
150 if (isVault) {
151 // First level of unwrapping for sett tokens.
152 IERC20(_vault).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
153 IERC20 vaultToken = IBridgeVault(_vault).token();
154
155 uint256 beforeBalance = vaultToken.balanceOf(address(this));
156 IBridgeVault(_vault).withdraw(IERC20(_vault).balanceOf(address(this)));
157 uint256 balance = vaultToken.balanceOf(address(this)).sub(beforeBalance);
158
159 // If the vault token does not match requested burn token, then we need to further unwrap
160 // vault token (e.g. withdrawing from crv sett gets us crv lp tokens which need to be unwrapped to renbtc).
161 if (address(vaultToken) != _token) {
162 vaultToken.safeTransfer(curveTokenWrapper, balance);
163 ICurveTokenWrapper(curveTokenWrapper).unwrap(_vault);
164 }
165 } else {
166 token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
167 }
168
169 uint256 wbtcTransferred = wBTC.balanceOf(address(this)).sub(startBalanceWBTC);
170
171 if (!isRenBTC) {
172 _swapWBTCForRenBTC(wbtcTransferred, _slippage);
173 }
174
175 uint256 toBurnAmount = renBTC.balanceOf(address(this)).sub(startBalanceRenBTC);
176 uint256 fee = _processFee(renBTC, toBurnAmount, burnFeeBps);
177
178 uint256 burnAmount = registry.getGatewayBySymbol("BTC").burn(_btcDestination, toBurnAmount.sub(fee));
179
180 emit Burn(burnAmount, wbtcTransferred, fee);
181 }
182
183 function mintAdapter(MintArguments memory args) internal returns (bool) {
184 if (args._vault != address(0) && !approvedVaults[args._vault]) {
185 return false;
186 }
187
188 uint256 wbtcExchanged;
189 bool isVault = args._vault != address(0);
190 bool isRenBTC = args._token == address(renBTC);
191 IERC20 token = isRenBTC ? renBTC : wBTC;
192
193if (!isRenBTC) {
194 // Try and swap and transfer wbtc if token wbtc specified.
195 uint256 startBalance = token.balanceOf(address(this));
196 if (!_swapRenBTCForWBTC(args._mintAmountMinusFee, args._slippage)) {
197 return false;
198 }
199 uint256 endBalance = token.balanceOf(address(this));
200 wbtcExchanged = endBalance.sub(startBalance);
201 }
202
203 emit Mint(args._mintAmount, wbtcExchanged, args._fee);
204
205 uint256 amount = isRenBTC ? args._mintAmountMinusFee : wbtcExchanged;
206
207
Comments to Code: 1413 / 4770 = 30 %
Tests to Code: 7029 / 4770 = 147 %