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FAIL
Exploit Report On 21 Dec 2021, Visor suffered a hack causing preventable loss of 8M a major loss (51% of TVL). This causes a penalty of 30% in place until 21 June 2022. Details: https://rekt.news/visor-finance-rekt/
The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.
Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.
This section looks at the code deployed on the Mainnet that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.
1. Are the executing code addresses readily available? (%)
They are available at website https://docs.visor.finance/visor-protocol/technical-architecture/visor, as indicated in the Appendix.
2. Is the code actively being used? (%)
Activity is over 10 transactions a day on contract VisorFactory.sol, as indicated in the Appendix.
3. Is there a public software repository? (Y/N)
Is there a public software repository with the code at a minimum, but also normally test and scripts. Even if the repository was created just to hold the files and has just 1 transaction, it gets a "Yes". For teams with private repositories, this answer is "No"
4. Is there a development history visible? (%)
With 9 commits and 3 branches, this is an underdeveloped software repository.
This metric checks if the software repository demonstrates a strong steady history. This is normally demonstrated by commits, branches and releases in a software repository. A healthy history demonstrates a history of more than a month (at a minimum).
5. Is the team public (not anonymous)? (Y/N)
The team is anonymous.
For a "Yes" in this question, the real names of some team members must be public on the website or other documentation (LinkedIn, etc). If the team is anonymous, then this question is a "No".
This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
7. Are the basic software functions documented? (Y/N)
There are no software functions documented in the Visor Finance documentation.
8. Does the software function documentation fully (100%) cover the deployed contracts? (%)
There are no software functions documented in the Visor Finance documentation.
9. Are there sufficiently detailed comments for all functions within the deployed contract code (%)
The Comments to Code (CtC) ratio is the primary metric for this score.
10. Is it possible to trace from software documentation to the implementation in code (%)
There are no software functions documented in the Visor Finance documentation. Therefore, we cannot evaluate the traceability towards their implementation in the Visor source code.
11. Full test suite (Covers all the deployed code) (%)
This score is guided by the Test to Code ratio (TtC). Generally a good test to code ratio is over 100%. However the reviewers best judgement is the final deciding factor.
12. Code coverage (Covers all the deployed lines of code, or explains misses) (%)
There is a reasonable set of tests, but no indication of code coverage in any of the Visor Finance documentation or in their Certik audit report.
13. Scripts and instructions to run the tests? (Y/N)
Scrips/Instructions location: https://github.com/VisorFinance/hypervisor.
14. Report of the results (%)
There are no test result reports available in any of the Visor Finance documentation or GitHub repositories.
15. Formal Verification test done (%)
There is no evidence of a Visor Finance Formal Verification test in any of their documentation or in further web searches.
16. Stress Testing environment (%)
There is no evidence of any Visor Finance testnet smart contract usage in any of their documentation.
This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.
17. Did 3rd Party audits take place? (%)
Certik published a Visor Finance audit report on July 7th 2021, which is after their Hypervisor mainnet launch in late May. Two items of concern from the audit. First re-entracy risks exist and were not resolved. Second the Owner has very high power.
18. Is the bug bounty acceptable high? (%)
Visor Finance has an active Bug Bounty program with Immunefi at https://immunefi.com/bounty/visorfinance/.
This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.
19. Can a user clearly and quickly find the status of the access controls (%)
There are currently no access controls documented in the Visor Finance documentation. Based on our reading, this is an upgradeable contract with OnlyOwner and no timelock or multisig.
20. Is the information clear and complete (%)
There are currently no access controls documented in the Visor Finance documentation.
21. Is the information in non-technical terms that pertain to the investments (%)
There are currently no access controls documented in the Visor Finance documentation.
22. Is there Pause Control documentation including records of tests (%)
There is no evidence of a Pause Control or similar functions in any of the Visor Finance documentation.
1contract Hypervisor is IHypervisor, Powered, Ownable {
2 using SafeMath for uint256;
3 using EnumerableSet for EnumerableSet.AddressSet;
4
5 /* constants */
6
7 // An upper bound on the number of active stakes per vault is required to prevent
8 // calls to rageQuit() from reverting.
9 // With 30 stakes in a vault, ragequit costs 432811 gas which is conservatively lower
10 // than the hardcoded limit of 500k gas on the vault.
11 // This limit is configurable and could be increased in a future deployment.
12 // Ultimately, to avoid a need for fixed upper bounds, the EVM would need to provide
13 // an error code that allows for reliably catching out-of-gas errors on remote calls.
14 uint256 public constant MAX_STAKES_PER_VAULT = 30;
15 uint256 public constant MAX_REWARD_TOKENS = 50;
16 uint256 public constant BASE_SHARES_PER_WEI = 1000000;
17 uint256 public stakeLimit = 2500 ether;
18
19 /* storage */
20
21 HypervisorData private _hypervisor;
22 mapping(address => VaultData) private _vaults;
23 EnumerableSet.AddressSet private _bonusTokenSet;
24 EnumerableSet.AddressSet private _vaultFactorySet;
25
26 /* initializer */
27
28 /// @notice Initizalize Hypervisor
29 /// access control: only proxy constructor
30 /// state machine: can only be called once
31 /// state scope: set initialization variables
32 /// token transfer: none
33 /// @param ownerAddress address The admin address
34 /// @param rewardPoolFactory address The factory to use for deploying the RewardPool
35 /// @param powerSwitchFactory address The factory to use for deploying the PowerSwitch
36 /// @param stakingToken address The address of the staking token for this Hypervisor
37 /// @param rewardToken address The address of the reward token for this Hypervisor
38 /// @param rewardScaling RewardScaling The config for reward scaling floor, ceiling, and time
39 constructor(
40 address ownerAddress,
41 address rewardPoolFactory,
42 address powerSwitchFactory,
43 address stakingToken,
44 address rewardToken,
45 RewardScaling memory rewardScaling,
46 uint256 _stakeLimit
47 ) {
48 // the scaling floor must be smaller than ceiling
49 require(rewardScaling.floor <= rewardScaling.ceiling, "Hypervisor: floor above ceiling");
50
51 // setting rewardScalingTime to 0 would cause divide by zero error
52 // to disable reward scaling, use rewardScalingFloor == rewardScalingCeiling
53 require(rewardScaling.time != 0, "Hypervisor: scaling time cannot be zero");
54
55 // deploy power switch
56 address powerSwitch = IFactory(powerSwitchFactory).create(abi.encode(ownerAddress));
57
58 // deploy reward pool
59 address rewardPool = IFactory(rewardPoolFactory).create(abi.encode(powerSwitch));
60
61 // set internal configs
62 Ownable.transferOwnership(ownerAddress);
63 Powered._setPowerSwitch(powerSwitch);
64
65 // commit to storage
66 _hypervisor.stakingToken = stakingToken;
67 _hypervisor.rewardToken = rewardToken;
68 _hypervisor.rewardPool = rewardPool;
69 _hypervisor.rewardScaling = rewardScaling;
70
71 stakeLimit = _stakeLimit;
72
73 emit event
74 emit HypervisorCreated(rewardPool, powerSwitch);
75 }
76
77 /* getter functions */
78
79 function getBonusTokenSetLength() external view override returns (uint256 length) {
80 return _bonusTokenSet.length();
81 }
82
83 function getBonusTokenAtIndex(uint256 index)
84 external
85 view
86 override
87 returns (address bonusToken)
88 {
89 return _bonusTokenSet.at(index);
90 }
91
92 function getVaultFactorySetLength() external view override returns (uint256 length) {
93 return _vaultFactorySet.length();
94 }
95
96 function getVaultFactoryAtIndex(uint256 index)
97 external
98 view
99 override
100 returns (address factory)
101 {
102 return _vaultFactorySet.at(index);
103 }
104
105 function isValidVault(address target) public view override returns (bool validity) {
106 // validate target is created from whitelisted vault factory
107 for (uint256 index = 0; index < _vaultFactorySet.length(); index++) {
108 if (IInstanceRegistry(_vaultFactorySet.at(index)).isInstance(target)) {
109 return true;
110 }
111 }
112 // explicit return
113 return false;
114 }
115
116 function isValidAddress(address target) public view override returns (bool validity) {
117 // sanity check target for potential input errors
118 return
119 target != address(this) &&
120 target != address(0) &&
121 target != _hypervisor.stakingToken &&
122 target != _hypervisor.rewardToken &&
123 target != _hypervisor.rewardPool &&
124 !_bonusTokenSet.contains(target);
125 }
126
127 /* Hypervisor getters */
128
129 function getHypervisorData() external view override returns (HypervisorData memory hypervisor) {
130 return _hypervisor;
131 }
132
133 function getCurrentUnlockedRewards() public view override returns (uint256 unlockedRewards) {
134 // calculate reward available based on state
135 return getFutureUnlockedRewards(block.timestamp);
136 }
137
138 function getFutureUnlockedRewards(uint256 timestamp)
139 public
140 view
141 override
142 returns (uint256 unlockedRewards)
143 {
144 // get reward amount remaining
145 uint256 remainingRewards = IERC20(_hypervisor.rewardToken).balanceOf(_hypervisor.rewardPool);
146 // calculate reward available based on state
147 unlockedRewards = calculateUnlockedRewards(
148 _hypervisor.rewardSchedules,
149 remainingRewards,
150 _hypervisor.rewardSharesOutstanding,
151 timestamp
152 );
153 // explicit return
154 return unlockedRewards;
155 }
156
157 function getCurrentTotalStakeUnits() public view override returns (uint256 totalStakeUnits) {
158 // calculate new stake units
159 return getFutureTotalStakeUnits(block.timestamp);
160 }
161
162 function getFutureTotalStakeUnits(uint256 timestamp)
163 public
164 view
165 override
166 returns (uint256 totalStakeUnits)
167 {
168 // return early if no change
169 if (timestamp == _hypervisor.lastUpdate) return _hypervisor.totalStakeUnits;
170 // calculate new stake units
171 uint256 newStakeUnits =
172 calculateStakeUnits(_hypervisor.totalStake, _hypervisor.lastUpdate, timestamp);
173 // add to cached total
174 totalStakeUnits = _hypervisor.totalStakeUnits.add(newStakeUnits);
175 // explicit return
176 return totalStakeUnits;
177 }
178
179 /* vault getters */
180
181 function getVaultData(address vault)
182 external
183 view
184 override
185 returns (VaultData memory vaultData)
186 {
187 return _vaults[vault];
188 }
Comments to Code: 77 / 375 = 21 %
Tests to Code: 540 / 375 = 144 %